Internet Censorship will Never Inhibit Freedom of Speech
In today's world, the importance of freedom of speech and democracy is quite clear. However, certain individuals and governments do not appreciate the simplicity of these words, together with the desire of freedom seekers for democracy. Freedom of speech has a valuable and priceless meaning in reality and is also highly respected in the cyber sphere.
The democratic nature of the cyber sphere has led to some problems, including internet filtering and difficulties for internet users in countries such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and China. Internet filtering does not have a long history in Iran but in other countries it has specifically been used in some networks and programs to avoid child abuse (e.g. sexual abuse). Parents would protect their children by buying the most popular internet filtering software or would use service providers that limit access to the internet.
Unfortunately, because of filtering facilities available to the government internet users have encountered greater difficulties. The internet filtering technology, which Iran uses for the Dita network and in the national telecommunication system, is designed and produced by China. Interestingly, 90% of software designed to by-pass the internet is also produced in China.
Initially the Iranian authorities used the filtering system to stop the Iranian public from having access to pornographic websites and any obscene materials; however, as time passed, it became obvious that the main purpose of using this system was to block websites opposing the theocratic regime.
This plan was initiated successfully after approximately 6 million pornographic and sexual websites were blocked; the plan for stopping anti-government internet servers and websites commenced 2 years later.
Currently, after 8 years, the system has reached the point where individual weblogs are being filtered (separately from millions of Farsi weblogs). Anti-government sites (criticising President Ahmadinejad) have been filtered to deny users any access to them. Cultural and social networking sites, such as Club.com and Facebook were filtered twice; however, they were anti-filtered by order of the Tehran Prosecution Offices. Even video and picture sharing websites, such as Flickr and Youtube were filtered, blocking access to the internet.
It is worth mentioning that Facebook and Youtube have been filtered and anti-filtered a few times. Some internet users believe that internet filtering comes into effect when there is sensitive content. Another common opinion is that internet filtering authorities use the cyber sphere to allow the public to express their opinion in order to then restrict them. This is the method that the Iranian Intelligence organizations, such as the intelligence units of the Revolutionary Guards (Sepah Pasdaran), have lately been performing to identify and suppress opposition to the regime. The recent anti-filtering and re-filtering of Facebook, which has become incredibly popular among Iranians, supports this theory.
New Filtering system in Iran
Although the old proxy techniques were sufficient in limiting and blocking many internet websites, it has not been successful in performing all of the Iranian authority’s goals regarding filtering websites and avoiding anti-filtering activity. Consequently, the Iranian security officers have been thinking of adopting a new system.
Concerning the new system, Iran’s security agencies have come up with a new solution to this problem - the ‘National Filtering Intelligence Bank’ (NFIB). The NFIB combines the current method (i.e. filtering keywords) and now evaluates the contents of websites. According to Dita, this process can only be by-passed by using satellites. The new system uses personnel in addition to robot software to search for contentious websites. After identifying these sites, compiled lists are given to members of various industries, such as doctors, psychiatrists, clergymen, sociologists, intelligence personnel and so on. These members would then assess which site(s) should then be filtered. All the internet service providers must be connected to this programme in order to browse through the list of the filtered servers to avoid the user’s access.
The inevitable danger of using personnel in this system is that these people can enforce their personal views in managing these filtering systems. The NFIB has become active in the past few months and its effects are easily discernible on the internet in Iran. It has been anticipated that a huge number of these websites and blogs are going to be affected by this new blocking system.
The filtering and anti-filtering of Facebook prior to the Presidential Elections
The social networking website called ‘Facebook’ has been a source of attraction to many Iranian and non-Iranian users in the recent years. This website is a huge internet-based opportunity to keep in touch with friends, acquaintances, family members as well as to engage in web-based and virtual social activities. This website that had already been filtered a few times in Iran, was yet again filtered on 23rd May 2009. At this point, the NFIB had already built a solid database of its users. However, the filter was removed within 3 days, on 26th May 2009. The reason for this anti-filtering was because Facebook became a campaign for Mr. Mir Hossein Mousavi, one of the presidential candidates. Yet another reason accounts for its re-filtering prior to the elections. As already discussed, the security forces trend has been one of vigorous clampdowns, furtive monitoring and identifying networks for future detentions. Based on this trend, the initial removal of filtering of Facebook (the one prior to the re-filtering on 23rd May 2009), gave the security forces the opportunity to identify users and their friends, as well as to monitor their discussion threads and political beliefs. Obviously, the security forces also had the chance to disguise agents as friends to have access to further details of users, particularly because Facebook users had sincere trust in the security offered by the website. However, as noted, the filtering was removed only three days after its installation. This show of good will would clearly work in favour of the regime (Mr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s government), a few days prior to the elections.
The re-filtering of Facebook after the presidential elections
Once Ahmadinejad’s government regained power after the elections, a large number of people protested against the results, calling it rigged and Facebook became the website this group of people used to show their protests. Therefore, as expected, this website has been filtered since the elections, and with the growing trend of oppositions, it seems unlikely that the filtering will be removed in the near future. In fact, the filtering of most websites and blogs has only gained further momentum since the elections, and to take solid action against users and violators, the judiciary has recently implemented ‘web crime laws’ as a sign of fierce warning.
The official involvement of Revolutionary Guards (Sepah Pasdaran)
Firstly, it should be stated that since the establishment of the Revolutionary Guards, the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence (Vezarat-e Ettelaat), effectively no longer deals with security matters, acting instead as a symbolic entity. In reality, all security matters are dealt with by the Revolutionary Guards.
Some people believe that the establishment of the Revolutionary Guards in 1978 (1357) was a move to weaken and destroy the national armed forces. These Guards have become a very powerful force in many fields, such as technology and electronic.
The involvement of the Revolutionary Guards in internet and website content started when the Ministry of Intelligence was no longer able to perform their responsibilities on such issues. Consequently, the Ministry had no choice but to let the Revolutionary Guards take over.
To put it simply, the Revolutionary Guards are responsible for controlling the internet and punishing offenders (as announced by the government). However, the judiciary also performs a small role: to suppress and eradicate openly; since the Revolutionary Guards’ official involvement in internet filtering and blocking websites has been reduced significantly.
The Revolutionary Guards identify and suppress offensive websites via the creation of their own websites and the production and broadcasting of TV programmes. They no longer take covert action choosing instead to officially announce their campaign concerning the internet in Iran.
The “Gerdab” website contains statements made by the Revolutionary Guards announcing the destruction of all offensive, anti-religious and anti-regime websites. In doing so, the Revolutionary Guards endorse their old methods: scaremongering tactics, in order to demonstrate that they have the internet under control.
By continually introducing the “Holandi Project” and “Hagana”, as well as other fabricated projects, the public is continually warned of the dangers of not controlling the internet in the cyber sphere.
The official and physical challenge of the Revolutionary Guards regarding Iranian pornographic networks illustrates the regime's frustration and impotence.
The discussion at hand refers to designing the national intranet, which illustrates the selfish desires of the regime in controlling electronic communication in order to avoid internet users from receiving outside information.
The judiciary announced that as the presidential election was approaching, the internet and all Iranian blogs, including websites, would be monitored. Further, no destructive activities, or misrepresentation of the authorities that could serve to undermine the elections will not be tolerated. To consolidate this, the ‘web crime law’ was ratified, especially when the role of some European companies and their support of the Iranian government were exposed to the public by the state. With the purchase of an ‘internet control facility’ from Nokia-Siemens, the state can now monitor emails, chats and etc. by only reducing the speed of the internet, rather than the conventional and regular incision of the internet that the government used to adopt.
Reverse filtering
Reverse filtering refers to the limited access to internet service providers from abroad. This includes the denial of access to foreign internet companies from Iranian users. Google, for example, has blocked some of its services, such as downloading for Iranian users. The rationale for this is the American and international community's sanctions against Iran. Following widespread protests in search of democracy in Iran, reverse filtering was abolished in December 2009 by Mr. Barack Obama, the president of the United States of America.
Means in By-passing the Filters
There are various means for passing through filters; the following are two simple and most popular routes that Iranian internet users follow in Iran:
First method: Using web pages that act as an anti-filter; the user signs in and types the specific address in the relevant part and enters the site. This old method has almost been fully abandoned.
The disadvantage of this method is that the web page itself would be filtered. As a result, users no longer make use of it. Furthermore, this method is very slow, given that the opportunity of access to broadband in Iran is very limited for the majority of people; the bands are very limited. In addition, some of them, such as Windows Vista, are unknown or not compatible with the operating systems. Such anti-filtering sites contain dangerous material and internet viruses.
Second method: There are now new techniques which use anti-filter software rather than anti-filter pages.
Software, such as Ultrasurf, Free Gate and Gpass are the most popular filtering software. The most recent anti-filter software is called “Nasim”, created by Radio Farda, which has been designed based on Free Gate technology.
In relation to Ultrasurf, Iranian filtering centres have unfortunately been able to somehow access the ports of this software. Further, if the software is not regularly updated, it expires.
Gpass software has been designed in a way that sends images and video files of users to the developers and unknown servers without the users’ permission. In effect, this software is considered to be spying software. Since many users have been cautioned, they have stopped using this software. Nevertheless some unaware users in Iran still use this software. In order to get through reverse filtering, there is software that presents the Iranian user as a user from another country. There are several other means of getting around the filtering which are somewhat difficult and thus not necessary to explore in this article.
In conclusion, it should be mentioned that Iran is currently undergoing new improvements in filtering technology. In order to avoid filtering, people must keep up to date with and use the latest anti-filtering software, which are enhanced every now and then.
It is noticeable that since internet filtering commenced in Iran, so as to prevent the public from having access to information and the free cyber sphere, not only has the popularity of blogs and publications on freedom of speech and democracy not been decreased, but also because of the excitement of access to uncensored information, these servers have become dramatically more popular.
We should remember that the greatest mistake made by selfish governments is the forceful repression of freedom of speech.
Editor’s Profile
Hadi Naseri is a journalist, blogger and anti-censorship/freedom of expression activist who was born in Tehran. He used to be a program maker for Radio Zamaneh, a Farsi-based radio in the Netherlands, where he produced science articles, social reports, interviews, photos and news for about three years. Currently, he is collaborating with Radio Koocheh, a Farsi-based radio in Malaysia. He has also established the first internet anti-filtering group on Facebook, comprised of 2000 members, providing anti-filtering softwares and proxy servers to fight censorship on the web.

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